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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

RIC E. WANGSGARD,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
v.
FRED C. SCHWENDIMAN, CHIEF,
DRIVER LICENSE SERVICES,
LICENSE SERVICES, DEPARTMENT
OF PUBLIC SAFETY, STATE OF UTAH,

No. 860323
Category No. 13

Defendant/Respondent,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant, Ric E. Wangsgard, appeals from a judgment dismissing Appellant's Petition for Reinstatement of Appellant's Driving
Privileges and

Affirming

the

Decision

of

the

Driver's

License

Services, Department of Public Safety, suspending Appellant's
driving privileges pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §41-2-19.6
(1953, as amended), in the Third Judicial District Court, in and
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Raymond S. Uno,
presiding.
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT
Appellant's driving privileges were suspended pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated §41-2-19.6 (1953, as amended) by the Office of Drivers
License Services, Department of Public Safety.

Pursuant to Utah Code

Annotated §41-2-20 (1953, as amended), Appellant appealed the decision

by petition

to

the Third

Judicial

District

Court

(T.2-6).

The

petition was dismissed after hearing and the suspension of Defendant's driving privileges affirmed (T.42-43a).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks to have the judgment against him reversed and
the record

of

the

suspension

removed

from

his

driving

record.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The issues presented in this appeal are as follows:
1.

Did the hearing examiner for the Office of Drivers License

Services improperly

consider

performed by Appellant

evidence

of

after the arresting

a

field

sobriety

test

officer threatened to

take Appellant to jail?
2.

Did the hearing examiner improperly consider the purported

results of a chemical test without the sufficient foundation necessary to admit said results into evidence?
3.

Was there sufficient, competent evidence presented at the

Appellant's drivers license hearing to support the decision of the
hearing examiner to suspend Appellant's driving privileges as authorized by Utah Code Annotated §41-2-19.6 (1953, as amended)?
4.

Did the Office of Driver's License Services deny Appellant

his constitutional and statutory rights by suspending Appellant's
driving privileges before a decision on the hearing was rendered
and before Appellant was notified of that decision?

-2-

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On January 4, 1966, Appellant was cited for driving under the
influence of Alcohol (T.149).

Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §41-

2-19.6 (1953, as amended), Appellant and his attorney appeared at
a hearing before a hearing examiner, held by the Office of Drivers
License Services

for

driving privileges

the

purpose

should

be

of

determining

suspended

if

Appellant's

for three months because

there existed reasonable grounds to believe Appellant was driving
under the influence.

Also present at the hearing was the arresting

officer and assisting officers (T.138).
At the hearing on the matter the hearing examiner received and
considered certain evidence allegedly representing the results of a
chemical test, purporting

to

reflect

the

blood

alcohol

level of Appellant at the time of driving (T.138-146).

content

The evidence

supporting the test result consisted only of the testimony of the
officer conducting the test and the officer's notation thereof on a
police report

form

evidence verifying

(T.17,

150a).

The

that the required

officer

aid

not

present

procedures in administering

the test were followed, that the intoxilyzer was properly calibrated
and maintained as required by law (T.108-110).
To support a finding that the officer had reasonable grounds
to believe Appellant was operating a vehicle under the influence,
the peace officer further testified that the Appellant refused to
submit to

certain

submitted to

field

one test

sobriety

after the

tests

and that

Appellant

officer threatened

only

to take the

Appellant to jail if he would not perform the tests (T.100-107).
-3-

Appellant was not advised of his Miranda rights prior to submitting
to the tests (T.100).
Despite Appellants counsel's timely objections to the receipt
and admission of this evidence, the hearing officer received it, made
it part of the record, and based his decision on it (T.127-129;
132-133; 138-146).

The officer also testified at the hearing that

the vehicle was being driven reasonably and prudently prior to the
stop with no erratic movements (T.81-82; 90-91), that Appellant's
balance and

speech were normal

Appellant was

(T.95), but that he believed the

under the influence and

he could arrest

for that

violation based only on the odor of alcohol on Appellant's breath,
and the presence of purported beer cans in the vehicle (T.97-98).
After hearing on this matter, the case was taken under advisement.

Appellant's driving privileges were subsequently

suspended

pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §41-6-19.6 (1953, as amended)
effective 31 days after his arrest on January 4, 1986 (T.137).

The

suspension was effective February 4, 1986, before a decision was
made by the hearing
hearing.

Appellant

examiner
was

based on the evidence presented

not

sent

notice

of

the

February 19, 1986 or February 29, 1986 (T.137).
have a valid

driver's

license

on his person

decision

on

until

Appellant did not
between

the actual

suspension date and the date he received notice.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Appellant

contends

that

the decision

of the Office

of

Drivers License was arbitrary and capricious and the Third Judicial
-4-

District Court
ing reasons:

erred

in affirming that decision for the follow-

The hearing

suspension hearing

examiner

improperly

who presided

considered

and

over

based

upon evidence which should not have been received.
there was

not

sufficient

competent

evidence

Appellant's

his

decision

Additionally,

presented

at

that

hearing to make a determination that the Office of Drivers License
Services had the authority to suspend Appellant's driving privileges
pursuant to

Utah Code Annotated

§41-2-19.6

(1953,

as

amended).

Appellant further contends that the State of Ltah, by and through
the Department of Public Safety, Office of Driver's License Services
violated Appellant's statutory and constitutional rights by suspending Appellant's license prior to a decision by the Hearing Examiner
and notice to Appellant.
ARGUMENT
Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, §41-2-19.6 (1953, as amended),
the Office of Drivers License Services is authorized to suspend a
person's driving

privileges upon a finding

that

the officer

had

reasonable grounds to believe the person was in violation of §41-6^44 (1983).

At hearing to determine whether the officer had reason-

able grounds the hearing examiner condisers certain evidence which is
deemed to be relevant to the officer's decision that the individual
was driving

under the

influence.

As reflected

by the

required

report form submitted to the agency by the officer, this evidence
can include the driving pattern of the person, his or her physical
characteristics, and the results of field sobriety tests performed
-5-

and blood

alcohol

tests

(T.150-151).

The

admissibility

evidence is not without legal limitations however.

of

his

The following

agruments verify certain evidence received by the hearing examiner
and relied upon in making his decision was improperly admitted and
without it there was not sufficient evidence to suspend the Appellant's driving privileges.
POINT I: THE HEARING OFFICER IMPROPERLY
CONSIDERED THE RESULT OF A FIELD SOBRIETY
TEST
As part of his investigation of this matter, and prior to the
arrest of Appellant, the arresting officer, Officer Harris, requested
the Appellant to take certain field

sobriety

tests (T.65).

Upon

this request the Appellant refused to submit to the field sobriety
tests (T.65-66, 101). The arresting officer then called a back-up
officer, Sgt. Whitney,
submit to

the

tests

and

discussed

(T.66,

101).

the Appellant's
Sgt.

Whitney

refusal to

then

told

the

Appellant that if the arresting officer had probable cause that he
had a right to request, Appellant, to

take a field

sobriety test

and if he didn't he would be placed under arrest and taken to jail
(T.121).

Only after the Appellant was threatened with jail Appel-

lant started to perform one test, a hand slap test (T.121).

Appel-

lant did not complete the test according to the arresting officer
(T.15).

He was then placed under arrest for his refusal to continue

or complete

the

tests

(T.69,

Appellant was not advised
arrest (T.102).

102).

The

officer

admitted

that

of his Miranda rights until after his

The officer further admitted that at the time he
-6-

requested the

Appellant

to

take

the

field

sobriety

test, that

Appellant would not have been free to leave (T.97) , that Appellant's
liberty had been restrained (T.98) and his investigation had centered on

the

Appellant

(T.99).

At

hearing

on

this matter

the

arresting officer testified as to the result of the test which was
partially taken (T.69).

The hearing examiner admitted this evidence

at the hearing, and in part, based his findings on the result of
Appellant's partial

performance on the hand

slap test, which he

described as poor (T.140).
Appellant submits that the admission of this evidence was in
error because it was obtained through an illegal search and seizure
of Appellant's person.
To Appellant's knowledge, this Court has not as yet subjected
breath or field sobriety tests to constitutional scrutiny under the
search and seizure provisions of the Utah or United States Constitutions.

This Court has, however, recognized on at least one occasion

that breath tests may be subject to the search and seizure laws.
See, American Fork City vs. Cosgrove 701 P.2d 1099 (Utah 1985) (J.
Zimmerman concurring).

A neighboring jurisdiction, Colorado, has

subjected field sobriety tests to constitutional scrutiny under the
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable
seizures.

searches and

16_. at 1075.* By the nature of the tests they

can be

considered searches and seizures of evidence because they involve a
trespass upon a person which yields evidence of impairment necessary
to prove the crime.
The exclusionary

(See American Fork City, supra, Carver, supra).
rule

which

*Pec&l% vs. Helm, 633 P.2d 1071 - 7 (Colo. 1981

prohibits

the

use

of

evidence

obtained through illegal searches and seizures in a criminal proceeding is equally applicable to civil proceedings in this state.
State of Utah by and through the Industrial Commission vs. Wasatch
Metal & Salvage Co. , 594 P.2d

894, Utah 894 (See also Tirado vs.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue 689 F.2d 307 (2nd Cir. 1982) for
the proposition that the exclusionary rule is applicable in civil
proceedings which result from criminal investigations if the evidence was

seized

in

contemplation

of use in a civil

proceeding

because the deterrance purpose of the rule would be served.

That

is clearly the case here where a driver1 s license hearing is collateral to a DUI arrest.)
Both the Fourth Amendment of the United

States Constitution

and Article 1 Section 14 of the Utah Constitution provide:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Interpreting both the above Constitutional rights synonomously,
the Utah Supreme Court has determined all warrantless searches are
per se unreasonable except the following exceptions:
They include consent searches, Washington v. Chrisman, 455
U.S. 1, 102 S.Ct. 812, 70 L.Ed.2d 778 (1982); searches and
seizures made in hot pursuit, Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294,
87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967); searches and seizures of
contraband in areas lawfully accessible to the public, State
v. Shreve, Utah, 667 P.2d 590 (1983), seizure of evidence in
plain view after lawful intrusion, State v. Romero, Utah, 660
P.2d 715 (1983); searches and seizures incident to lawful
arrest based on probable cause under exigent circumstances,
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d
685 (1969); State in interest of K.K.C., Utah, 636 P.2d 1044
(1981).
-8-

State v, Harris, 671 P.2d 175 at 179 (Utah 1983).
By the facts of this case and nature of field sobriety tests,
none of

the

above-stated

exceptions

except the "consent" exception.

should

apply

in

this

case

A peace officer may have the right

as part of an investigatory stop to ask a DUI suspect to voluntarily
submit to field sobriety tests. See Salt Lake City vs. earner, 664
P.2d 1168

(Utah

1983).

However, the officer

person to submit to those tests.
409 P.2d 829 (1966).

cannot

compel

the

Lanford vs. People, 159 Colo. 36,

There is no statutory mandate

requiring a

DUI suspect to submit to a field sobriety test in Utah.
As recognized in the Helm case, supra, the determination as to
whether the results are admissible as an exception to search and
seizure laws

becomes

an

issue

of

whether

or

not

the

Appellant

legally voluntarily consented to perform the field sobriety test.
Whether consent is voluntary is determined under a totality of
the circumstances test according to Schneckloth vs. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 1041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973).

In Schneckloth,

supra, the United States Supreme Court ruled that " . . . the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendment require that a consent not be coerced by
explicit or implicit means by implied threat or covert force."
at 412 U.S. 228.

Id,

". . .[I]f under all the circumstances it has

appeared that the consent was not given voluntarily —
coercea by threats or force, or granted

that it was

only in submission to a

claim of lawful authority —

then we have found the consent invalid,

and the search unreasonable.

Ld. at 412 U.S. 233 (Citation omitted).
-9-

While custody

alone does not establish

factor to

considered.

be

See

involuntariness, it is a

United States vs. Watson

423

U.S.

411, 96 S. Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed. 2d 598 (1976).
The Utah Supreme Court examined this question of voluntariness
in State vs. Wittenback 621 P.2d 103 (Utah 1980).

In that case the

Court recognized the State has the burden of showing voluntariness
with the following factors evidencing lack of duress or coercion:
"(1) the absence of a claim of authority to search by the officers;
(2) the absence of an exhibition of force by the officers; (3) a
mere request to search; (4) cooperation by the owner of the vehicle;
and (5) the absence of deception or trick on the part of the officer."
Icl. at 106.
Applying the above-stated rulings in this case, the circumstances
under which the Appellant submitted to a field sobriety test were
clearly involuntary.

It is evident from the record of the hearing

that Appellant was in a custodial situation at the time he agreed
to perform the hand slap test, because the arresting officer Harris
stated he would not have allowed the Appellant to leave on his own
free will at the time the officer requested Appellant to take the
field sobriety

tests

(T.97-99).

officer, told Appellant

Officer

Whitney,

the

assisting

he had authority to require the test by

telling the Appellant he had a right to make him ao them or arrest
him (T.121).

There was not a mere request to take them, but an

explicit threat to Appellant that if he did not ao the tests, he
would be arrested
(T.121).

for failure

to comply

with their

requirements

Appellant was not advised of his Miranda rights prior to
-10-

the request (T.102).

Appellant

specifically did not want to co-

operate as evidenced by his refusal to do the tests initially, and
refusing to finish the test after he started it.
The record

shows the officers exerted

a claim

of authority

under the circumstances by which Appellant was coerced to comply.
The threats of the officer, and prospect of jail were obviously
the only reason Appellant eventually

submitted to a partial test.

Under the totality of the circumstances of this case, Appellant's
submission to the field

test should

be deemed

involuntary.

The

results of those tests were then obtained pursuant to an unlawful
search and should not have been admitted at hearing on this matter
to determine if the officer had the grounds necessary for suspension
of Appellant's driving privileges.
ation of

this

evidence

was

The hearing examiner1s consider-

arbitrary

and

capricious

under

the

circumstances.
POINT II: THE HEARING EXAMINER IMPROPERLY CONSIDERED
THE PURPORTED RESULTS OF A CHEMICAL TEST AND BASED
HIS DECISION ON THOSE RESULTS ARBITRARILY AND
CAPRICIOUSLY
Incident to Appellant's arrest in the matter, he submitted to
a blood alcohol test.

Appellant submits that the results of the

test were improperly considered at hearing on this matter.
Utah Code Annotated §41-2-19.6

(1953, as amended)

gives the

Office of Drivers License Services authority to take administrative action suspending a person's driving privileges after submission to a chemical test "if the person's blood alcohol content is
.08% or more, or, if the officer makes a determination, based upon
-11-

reasonable grounds to
that the person
§41-6-44."

believe that the determination

is correct

is otherwise in violation of Utah Code Annotated

Utah Code Annotated §41-6-44 (1953, as amended) makes

it unlawful "for any person with a blood alcohol contenc of .08% or
greater by weight, or who is under the influence of alcohol or any
drug or the

combined

influence

of

alcohol

and any

drug

or the

combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree which renders
the person incapable of safely driving a vehicle, to be in actual
physical control of a vehicle within this state".
§41-6-44 (1953, as amended).
Office of

Drivers'

License

Utah Code Annotated

B^ the Department of Public Safety,
Services

own

regulations

(T.9-13),

unless drugs are involved, the Office of Drivers' License Services
will only take administrative action to suspend a driving privilefee
under the statute in cases where the arresting officers report on
its face, shows a test result of .08% or more by weight of alcohol
in the

blood

that if the

(T.10-11).
Blood

Alcohol

administration suspension
under the influence

The

regulations

test

will

results
not

specifically

are less than

be taken pursuant

provide
.08% any

to driving

"per se" suspension, but can be taken under

Utah Code Annotated §41-2-19 (1953, as amended).

Where only drugs

are involved, the agency, by its own regulations, may take administrative action

based

on the officer's report pursuant

Code Annotated §41-21-19.6.

to Utah

The agency's regulations then specifi-

cally require a .08% or more, blood alcohol level reflected on the
officer's report before the agency will take action ana set a hearing
under Utah Code Annotated §41-2-19.6 (1953, as amended) unless that
-12-

report indicates drugs are involved (T.10-11).

This has been the

regular practice of the agency.
At an administrative hearing in which only alcohol is
allegedly involved, proof that the test result is .08% or over is
the most

important and

relevant evidence used against the person

accused.

In fact, legal evidence that the accused's blood alcohol

is .08% or over and was driving or in actual physical control of
a vehicle is all that is necessary to take administration action to
suspend the

license.

See

Garcia vs. Schwendiman 645

Utah Code Annotated
P.2d

651

(Utah

§41-2-19.6(2)

1985).

If

and

properly

proven, the blood alcohol is considered "per se" evidence that the
officer had reasonable grounds to believe the accused was under the
influence.

To prove the statutory blooa alcohol content, a

scientific analysis of the person's blood, urine or breath must be
made.

The Appellant's blood alcohol content in this case, as in

most DUI cases in this state was measured by chemical breath analysis.

To legally introduce a chemical breath analysis into evidence

certain statutory and administrative requirements must be met.

The

Utah Supreme Court recognized this in Murray City vs. Hall, 663 P.2d
1314 (Utah 1983).
ments of

In that case, the Court ruled that the require-

Utah Code Annotated

§41-6-44.3

(1953,

as

amended)

and

regulations authorized therein must be met before a breathalyzer
can be admitted

into evidence.

The ruling equally applies to the

intoxilyzer, the breathalyzer's rnoaern counterpart, which was used
to determine

the Appellant's

blooa

-13-

alcohol

Level

in this case.

Utah Code Annotated §41-6-44.3 (1953, as amended) provides:
(1) The commissioner of public safety shall establish
standards for the administration and interpretation of chemical analysis of a person's breath including standards of
training.
(2) In any action or proceeding in which it is material
to prove that a person was driving or in actual physical
control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or
driving with a blood alcohol content statutorily prohibited,
documents offered as memoranda or records of acts, conditions
or events to prove that the analysis was made and the instrument
used was accurate, according to standards established in
subsection (1) shall be admissible if:
(a) The judge finds that they were made in the regular
course of the investigation at or about the time of the act,
condition or event; and
(b) The source of information from which made and the
method and circumstances of their preparation were such as to
indicate their trustworthiness.
(3) If the judge finds that the standards established
under subsection (1) and the conditions of subsection (2) have
been met, there is a presumption that the test results are
valid and further foundation for introduction of the evidence
is unnecessary.
Introduction and admission of blood alcohol breath test results
in the administrative hearing are subject to meeting these statutory
criteria because

it is material

prove the person was driving

at a drivers license hearing to

with a statutorily prohibited blood

alcohol where a .08% "per seM violation is alleged as in this case.
Additionally, by its regulations the administrative agency invokes
its power

because

of those test

§41-2-19.6(5) (1953,
consider the

test

following judicial

as

results and Utah Code Annotated

amended)

result.

The

requires

Court

interpretation

of

the

in Murray
the

hearing

officer

supra made

above-stated

the

statute:

Section 41-6-44.3 is merely a codification of the findings
necessary co establish a proper foundation for the introduction
of breathalyzer evidence. It is a legislative recognition of
the universal acceptance of the reliability of such evidence.
Cf. , e.g., People v. Gower, 41 N.Y.2d 117, 397 N.YU.S.2d 368,
-14-

366 N.E.2d 69 (1977) (discussing the widespread acceptance of
the reliability of the breathalyzer). The enactment of §41-644.3 evinces an intent by the Legislature to relieve the State
of Utah and other governmental entities of the financial burden
of calling as a witness in every DUI case the public officer
responsible for testing the accuracy of the breathalyzer
equipment. The accuracy of the breathalyzer equipment depends
on both the proper functioning of the breathalyzer machine
itself and the proper compounding of chemicals in the ampoules.
The regulations enacted by the Commissioner of Public Safety
pursuant to § 41-6-44.3(1) require both a calibration of the
machine and a testing of the ampoules. Thus, in place of the
officer's testimony, §41-6-44.3 permits the admission of
affidavits regarding the maintenance of a specific breathalyzer
as evidence of the proper functioning of that breathalyzer
machine and the accuracy of the ampoules. However, prior to
the acceptance of those affidavits to establish a presumption
of the validity of the test results, §41-6-44.3 requires an
affirmative finding by the trial court that (1) the calibration
and testing for accuracy of the breathalyzer and the ampoules
were performed in accordance with the standards established by
the Commissioner of Public Safety, (2) the affidavits were
prepared in the regular course of the public officer's duties,
(3) that they were prepared contemporaneously with the act,
condition or event, and (4) the "source of information from
which made and the method and circumstances of their preparation
were such as to indicate their trustworthiness."
Murray City vs. Hall, supra, 663 P.2d at 1320 (footnotes omitted).
As stated in the above-stated ruling from Murray, supra, the
breath testing

regulations

established

by

the

Commissioner

of

Public Safety require certain procedures be followed to verify the
accuracy of a breath test (T.158-167).
They contain in part the following procedure:
(a)

that the procedures outlined in the regulations to operate

the machine be followed (See T.159).
(b)

The written

to operate

checklists verifying all of the procedures

the machine properly

be prepared

officer, along with the test record
machine and

internally

which

and retained

is generated

by the

from the

records the blood alcohol content of the
-15-

person taking the test (See T.159).
(c)

That the machine be certified on a routine basis not to

exceed forty (40) days, by using calibration tests and using the
method and techniques outlined by the Commissioner of Public Safety
or manufacturer of the machine, and that the results of those tests
be recorded

appropriately

(T.160).

The Murray/Hall case defined

what was appropriate certification.

An example of those certificate

forms is contained at (T-12).
Pursuant to these requirements, in a typical DUI case, the
following documents are submitted to meet the foundational requirements:

the operational checklist, the test record, and affidavits

verifying the certification

of the machine before and after the

test given to the individual DUI suspect.

All of these documents

would contain the serial number of the machine the test was given
on.

Under Murray vs. Hall this documentary evidence is required to

meet these

statutory

mandates

and

admit

the

test

results

into

evidence.
In this case, no test record was offered or received as evidence
of Appellant's blood alcohol content (T.17).

No operational check

list was produced or received, and the officer who conducted the
test admitted he could not independently recall if all the operational procedures were followed

(T.108-110).

Only

one affidavit

pursuant to Murray City vs. Hall was received and became part of
the record (T.196).

The only evidence of Appellant's blood alcohol

content that was given at the hearing was the hearsay statements of
the officer, and

the DUI report

form.

-16-

The report

form did not

reflect the serial number of the intoxilyzer machine and the officer
was unaware of the exact number (T.108, 150a).
impossible to determine
related to the machine

if the

one affidavit

that Appellant

Therefore it was
submitted

actually

took his test on (T.108).

The hearing examiners findings reflect he used the blood alcohol
level as a basis for his determination that there was competent
evidence to suspend Appellant1s license.

He recorded on the find-

ings that the purported chemical test result was .14% (T.138a-139).
The findings also reflect

that the officer made a determination

that all operational procedures and foundational requirements were
met to

insure

the

proper

working

order

accuracy of the test results (T.139a).

of

the

intoxilyzer

and

The hearing officer there-

fore disregarded the statutory requirements by admitting the results
of the blood alcohol.

It should have been excluded as evidence at

said hearing then as a statutory violation and

inadmissible under

Murray City vs. Hall, supra.
Though hearsay evidence is admissible, at administrative
proceedings, Utah case law suggests that given the requirements of
due process, the hearsay evidence of the test result given in this
case is not sufficient.
The Utah

Supreme

Court

has

regularly

required

documented

chemical testing as an evidentiary basis for revoking a right or
privilege when the existence of alcohol is considered the basis for
revocation.
613 P.2d

In DeFusion Co. vs. Utah Liquor Control Commission,

1120 (Utah 1980) the Court vacated an order

revoking a

private club f s liquor license, when the Court took judicial notice
-17-

that a "screwdriver" contained alcohol, a necessary element of the
violation.

The Court noted that the statutory percentage weight by

alcohol must be proven and implied that without competent scientific
documented evidence a revocation based on a finding that alcohol
was proven was in error.
In a case nearly identical to DeFusion Co.

supra, The Club

Stanyon Street vs. Utah Liquor Control Commission 615 P.2d 435
(Utah 1980) the Court also found testimony as to alcohol content
insufficient to prove the existence of alcohol.

In vacating the

suspensions order of an administrative agency, the Court made the
following justification:
The Commission as an administrative body may be justified
in taking the position that it is not necessarily bound to
adhere to the technical rules of evidence and procedure as
applied in the courts. Nevertheless, wherein it is performing
a duty of a judicial nature in which the findings of facts and
the adjudication of important rights is involved, care should
be taken that the procedures should comport with standards of
fairness and due process.
Ri. at 436 (Footnotes omitted).
Comparatively, in DUI
evidence of a blood

cases

where an intoxilyzer

alcohol level, it is necessary

result is

to prove the

result with the required test record and documents verifying the
accuracy of the machine.
Since the Office of Drivers License Services is authorized to
invoke the administrative process on the mere allegation that the
suspects blood alcohol is .08% or over and can suspend a driving
right or privilege on the finding that the blood alcohol was .08%,
the hearing examiner's error in this case was extremely prejudicial
to Appellant.

It

is

impossible

to determine

-18-

from the

findings

what weight the blood alcohol level was given, whether or not it
was the

finding

upon

which

the

hearing

examiner

was

pursuaded

there was a preponderance of evidence to believe the Appellant was
under the influence.

The actions of the officer were arbitrary and

capricious then

in

and

The appropriate
the Appellant's

fairness

the

order

should

be

vacated.

remedy for this error would be to reinstate

driving

privileges.

Unfortunately,

Appellant1s

statutory suspension period of 90 days ran before the appeal was
filed and his privilege cannot be retroactively restored.

Nonethe-

less, the issue is not moot because the revocation remains recorded
on his driving record and will detrimentally affect the Appellant's
automobile insurance rates.

Record of that revocation remains on

Appellant's record for five years under State law, invoking
the enhancement provisions under Utah Code Annotated §41-2-19.6(5)
(1953, as amended).

If Defendant were charged with a second DUI

violation, and the administrative process resulted in a second per
se suspension, the second per se suspension would be for an additional
30 day period because of the prior suspension.
§41-2-19.6(5) (1953, as amended).

Utah Code Annotated

Because of these collateral and

enhancement consequences, Appellant should have the right to have
the suspension

stricken

from

his driving

record

and

this

Court

should issue an order directing the Department of Public Safety to
do the same.
POINT III: THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE PRESENTED
AT THE HEARING ON THIS MATTER TO DETERMINE THE OFFICER
HAD REASONABLE GROUNDS TO BELIEVE APPELLANT WAS DRIVING
UNDER THE INFLUENCE
-19-

For the State to have authority to suspend a person's driving
privilege, it must be proven at hearing, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that

the

believe the DUI

arresting

suspect

officer

was driving

had
or

reasonable

in actual

grounds

control

to

of a

vehicle while under the influence (See Utah Code Annotated §41-2-19.6
(1953, as amended),

and

Ballard vs. State Motor Vehicle Division,

595 P.2d 1302 (Utah 1979).

Appellant submits that the information

the arresting officer relied upon was not sufficient to establish
the officer had the reasonable grounds required.
In Ballard, supra, the Utah Supreme Court defined this evidentary standard as follows:
"Reasonable grounds" exist where the facts and circumstances
within the officer's knowledge and of which he had reasonably
trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant
a man of reasonable caution in the belief that a situation
exists." Jjd. at 1306.
By virtue of the arguments stated in Points I and II, the test
results relied on by the officer cannot be deemed to be trustworthy,
or admissible for the purpose of determining
had reasonable grounds.

whether the officer

Disregarding this evidence, the record is

conspiciously void of any substantiated, objective evidence which
would warrant

a person

preponderance of

the

of

reasonable

evidence that

caution

Appellant

to

believe

by a

was

impaired

to a

degree which would render him incapable of safely operating a motor
vehicle.
A review of the record verifies the following was testified to
by the arresting officer as evidence
(a)

of Appellant's violation:

that the vehicle was traveling 66 mph in a 55 mile an hour
-20-

zone and Appellant did
vehicle's lights

not pull right

were

activated

the vehicle he smelled

over after the

(T.13),

that

after

officer's

he

stopped

an odor of alcohol on Appellant's person

and in the vehicle and observed beer cans in the vehicle (T.14-15),
that Appellant

admitted

to

having

a

"couple

of

beers"

(T.15),

that Appellant's eyes were bloodshot (T.95).
However, Appellant's
further information

counsel

at

the

from the arresting

hearing

officer.

elicited

this

He believed the

Appellant was under the influence based only on the odor of alcohol
and presence

of beer cans in the vehicle (T.97-98).

He

further

acknowledged that there were other passengers in the vehicle (T.94)
and he had no knowledge as to whether Appellant had consumed the
contents of

any

of the

cans

(T.98).

He was

willing

to

arrest

Appellant based solely on the odor of alcohol if the field sobriety
tests were not performed (T.98).

The officer further acknowledged

that there was no erratic driving pattern (T.31-32) , ana the vehicle
appeared to be driven "reasonably and prudently" (T.90-91) and that
it was possible the back window and mirrors on the vehicle could
have been obscured
lant's bloodshot
other than

with mud

eyes

alcohol

could

(T.91-92).
have

consumption

He conceded

been attributable

(T.95).

In

regard

that Appelto

something

to the

other

physical characteristics of Appellant, the officer testified
Appellant didn't
speech (T.95).

seem to have any problems
Considering

all

the

with his balance

competent

testimony

on

or
the

record, the hearing officer's determination that the state met its
burden by a preponderance should be aeemed
-21-

arbritrary and capricious.
An individual should not be deprived of his/her right to drive
based only on a speeding infraction and the presence of alcohol on
his/her person, with no further reliable evidence of impairment.
The law does not and cannot proscribe and the mere consumption of
alcohol and driving of a vehicle thereafter.

There must be some

competent evidence of impairment to meet the statutory mandates.
In a typical DUI case, the allegation is usually supported by the
fact that

someone

is incapable of driving

safely.

The evidence

which indicates an impairment of the person's motor facilities such
as lack of coordination and balance.
the record

verifying

State errored

that

impairment

in determining

With no competent evidence on
existed

in this case, the

by a preponderance

of the evidence

that the officer had reasonable grounds to believe the Appellant
was driving under the influence.

Consequently, the decisiion should

be overturned and the suspension stricken from Appellant's record.
POINT IV: APPELLANT'S STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED BY THE SUSPENSION OF APPELLANT'S
DRIVING PRIVILEGE PRIOR TO A DECISION BY THE
HEARING EXAMINER AND NOTICE TO APPELLANT.
The statutory procedure initiated to suspend Appellant's
driving privileges is defined in Utah Code Annotated §41-2-19.6(3),
(5) (1953, as amended) as follows:
(3)

If the person submits to that chemical test and the
results indicate a blood alcohol content of .08% or more.
or if the officer makes a determination, based on reasonable grounds to believe that the determination is correct,
that the person is otherwise in violation of section
41-6-44, the officer directing administration of the test
or making the determination shall serve on the person, on
-22-

behalf of the department, immediate notice of the department's intention to suspend the person's privilege or
license to drive. If the officer serves that immediate
notice on behalf of the department he shall take the Utah
driver license or certificate or permit, if any, of the
driver, issue a temporary license effective for only 30
days, and supply to the driver, on a form to be approved
by the department, basic information regarding how to
obtain a prompt hearing before the department. A citation
issued by the officer may, if approved as to form by the
department, serve also as the temporary license.
Upon written request of a person who has been issued a 30day license, the department shall grant to the person an
opportunity to be heard within 30 days after the date of
arrest and issuance of the 30-day license, but the request
must be made within 10 days of the date of the arrest and
issuance of the 30-day license. A hearing, if held, shall
be before the department in the county in which the
arrest occurred, unless the department and the person agree
that the hearing may be held in some other county. The
hearing shall be documented and its scope shall cover the
issues of whether a peace officer had reasonable grounds
to believe the person to have been operating a motor
vehicle in violation of section 41-6-44, whether the
person refused to submit to the test, and the test results,
if any. In connection with a hearing the department or
its duly authorized agent may administer oaths and may
issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and the
production of relevant books and papers.
One or more
members of the department may conduct the hearing, and
any decision made after a hearing before any number of
the members of the department shall be as valid as if
made after a hearing before the full membership of the
department. After the hearing, the department shall
order, either that the person's license or privilege to
drive be suspended or that it not be suspended. A first
suspension, whether ordered or not challenged under this
subsection, shall be for a period of 90 days, beginning
on the 31st day after the date of the arrest. A second
or subsequent suspension under this subsection shall be
for a period of 120 days, beginning on the 31st day after
the date of arrest. The department shall assess against
a person, in addition to any fee imposed under subsection
41-2-8(7), a fee of $25, which must be paid before the
person's driving privilege is reinstated, to cover administrative costs, and which fee shall be cancelled if the
person obtains an unappealled department-hearing or court
decision that the suspension was not proper.
A person
whose license has been suspended by the department under
this subsection may file a petition within 30 days after
-23-

the suspension for a hearing in the matter which, if
held, shall be governed by the provisions of section
41-2-20. Utah Code Annotated §41-2-19,6(3) (5) (1953,
as amended) (emphasis added).
In this case, on the date of his arrest ana after a submission
to a chemical

test the Appellant's physical drivers

license was

taken by the arresting officer and he was issued a temporary license
in citation form effective for only 30 days in accordance with the
above-stated section

(T.149).

Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §41-2-19.6(5) Appellant timely
requested a hearing (T.153-154).
1986, within
rendered by

the

30

days

the hearing

The hearing was held January 28,

authorized

(T.147).

No

decision

examiner and no notice was sent

was

to the

Appellant or his counsel by February 4, 1986, the effective date
of the suspension (T.137).

The notice eventually sent, on its face,

verifies that the suspension of Appellant's driving privileges was
effective on the 31st day after the arrest, February 4, 1986, as
provided by statute (T.137).
aid not

get

sent

a

notice

It additionally showed that Appellant
until

February

19, that

counsel did not get sent notice until February 29

Appellant's

(T.137).

Appel-

lant's 30 day temporary license expired by Office of Drivers License
Service records on February 4.

Appellant was effectively without

his driving privileges or a valid license on his person then prior
to notice that they were legally
actions, the
denied his

Office

driving

of

Driver

provileges

suspended.
License

without

By the above-stated

Services,
being

accorded

statutory and constitutional rights to due process.
-24-

Appellant
his

was
full

Statutorily Appellant has a right to hearing before revocation
of his license under Utah Code Annotated §41-2-19.6 (1953, as amended).

Implicit

in that

decision rendered

statutory

scheme is the right to have a

on that hearing

prior

to a

revocation

of his

driving privilege. Upon receiving the statutory request for hearing,
the office is required to make a determination based on evidence at
the hearing that the officer had reasonable grounds to believe the
arrested was within the statutory prohibition of Utah Code Annotated
§41-2-19.6(5) (1953, as amended).
Department to make a decision

on

In this case the failure of the
the evidence presented

at that

hearing prior to the revocation of Appellant's driving privileges
was tantamount to denying Appellant a hearing prior to the revocation.

If an order and notice is not given on the date prior to the

suspension, the suspension violates the Department regulations ana
the statutory

rights of Appellant.

The Department's

regulations

require that notice be given of the suspension order pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated §41-1-16 (1953, as amended) (T-12).

It

provides:
Giving of notice — Method. Whenever the department
is authorized or required to give any notice under this act or
other law regulating the operation of vehicles, unless a
different method of giving such notice is otherwise expressly
prescribed, such notice shall be given either by personal
delivery thereof to the person to be so notified or by deposit
in the United States mail of such notice in an envelope with
postage prepaid, addressed to such person at his address as
shown by the records of the department. The giving of notice
by mail is complete upon the expiration of four days after
such deposit of said notice. Proof of the giving of notice in
either such manner may be made by the certificate of any
officer or employee of the department or affidavit of any
person over eighteen years of age, naming the person to whom
-25-

such notice was given and specifying the time, place and manner
of the giving thereof.
In this case then, notice to Appellant would have been effective
February 23, at the earliest, 4 days after the date it was purportedly mailed to Appellant,
Both the United States and Utah Supreme Court have recognized
that a driver's license is a valuable, protected interest, which
cannot be taken away by the State without federally mandated due
process of law.

In Bell v. Burson 402 U.S. 535 (1971) the United

States Supreme Court outlined that right as follows:
Once licenses are issued, as in petitioner's case, their
continued possession may become essential in the pursuit of a
livelihood. Suspension of issued licenses thus involves state
action that adjudicates important interests of the licensees.
In such cases the licenses are not to be taken away without
that procedural due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment. Sniadach v Family Finance Corp. 395 US 337, 23 L Ed 2d
349, 89 S Ct 1820 (1969); Goldberg v Kelly, 397 US 254, 25 L
Ed 2d 287, 90 S Ct 1011 (1970). This is but an application of
the general proposition that relevant constitutional restraints
limit state power to terminate an entitlement whether the
entitlement is denominated a "right" or a "privilege." Ici. at
Following that mandate under the Utah Constitution, the Utah Supreme
Court, in Ballard vs. State, Motor Vehicle Division 595 P.2d
(Utah 1979)

stated

"the

right

to drive is a valuable

1302

right

or

privilege and it cannot be taken away without procedural due process"
Ballard vs. State Motor Vehicle Division supra,

at

595

P.2d

1304

(citing Bell, supra).
The Court in Ballard, supra, citing Bell , further noted that
" . . . the State cannot arbitrarily revoke such a valuable privilege . . . . " §95 P.2d.

By issuing a suspension order prior to a

determination and notice to the Arrestee, the suspension was arbi-26-

trary and capricious in this case.
Due process rights under the Utah Constitution (Art. 1, Sec. 7)
have been interpreted to require hearing and notice before suspension.
In Celebrity Club vs. Utah Liquor Control Commission 657 P.2d 1296
(Utah 1982) the Utah Supreme Court outlined the due process requirements in

administrative

proceedings

under

the Utah

Constitution

as follows:
The Constitution

of

Utah,

Article

I,

Section

7

provides:

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law.
This Court has explained the due process guarantee as follows:
[N]either a court nor other judicial tribunal may deny a
person a constitutional right or deprive such person of a
vested interest in property without any opportunity to be
heard. To do so constitutes taking of property without due
process of law.
Many attempts have been made to further define ,fdue
process" but they all resolve into the thought that a party
shall have his day in court — that is each party shall have
the right to a hearing before a competent court, with the
privilege of being heard and introducing evidence to establish
his cause or his defense, after which comes judgment upon the
record thus made.
Thus, the essential requirement of due process is that every
citizen be afforded his "day in court." It has always been
the policy of our law to resolve doubts in favor of permitting
parties to have their day in court on the merits of a controversy. JUi. at 1296 (footnotes omitted).
In the Celebrity Club case, supra, the Supreme Court reviewed a
statute authorizing revocation of a liquor license prior to notice
and hearing

to

the

licensee.

The

Court

determined

the

license

involved was "property" within the meaning of the Utah Constitution
and ruled that

interest

cannot be taken away without notice and
-27-

hearing.

That a drivers license involves a like property interest

has been recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in Bell, supra, ana
by this Court in Ballad, supra.
Other states recognize that a suspension of a privilege or
right cannot

legally

occur

until the

See e.g. People vs. Yount, 484 P.2d
State Ex Rel Larson, 533

P.2d

983

required

notice

is given.

1203 (Colo. 1971), Baker vs.
(Okl.

1983),

Hall vs. Oregon

Dept of Motor Vehicles, 457 P.2d 1975 (Or. App 1970).
By effectuating

a suspension the 31st day after Appellant1s

arrest, before rendering a decision, or notifying Appellant of that
decision, the

Office

of

Drivers

License

Services

violated

the

statutory scheme they are authorized to act under and the Appellant's
due process

rights, under

the

State

Constitution.

The District

Court should have ruled accordingly after argument on the appeal of
this matter.

As stated hereinabove the only appropriate and equit-

able remedy in this case is to strike the revocation from Appellant's
driving record.
CONCLUSION
The suspension

of

the

Appellant's

arbitrary and capricious for the reasons
arguments.

This Court

should therefore

driving

-28-

was

stated in the foregoing
issue an order directing

the Office of Drivers License Services to remove
from the Appellant's driving record.

privileges

the suspension

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 22nd day of October, 1986.

KRISTINE KAY SMITH
CONDER & WANGSSARD
4059 South 4000 West
West Valley City, Utah

84120
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I hereby
hand delivered

certify that on this ^ 2 - ^ a y
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copies
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foregoing

of October, 1986, I
to

the

Office

of

the Attorney General, State Capitol, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake
City, Utah

84111.
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41-2-19.6

MOTOR VEHICLES

63-43-10. Utah Code Annotated 1953. as last
amended by Chapter 2, Laws of Utah 1980,
Section 73-18-12. Utah Code Annotated 1953,
as last amended by Chapter 183. Laws of
Utah 1977. and Section 76-5-207. Utah Code
Annotated 1953, as last amended by Chapter
63, Laws of Utah 1981; enacts Sections
41-2-19.5 and 41-2-19.6, Utah Code Annotated

1953; repeals and reenacts Section 41-6-43,
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by
Chapter 242, Laws of Utah 1979; and repeals
Section 41-6-44.2, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
as last amended by Chapter 4, Laws of Utah
1982, Second Special Session. — Laws 1983,
ch. 99.

41-2-19.6. Chemical test — Grounds and procedure for officer's request —
Taking license — Report to department — Procedure by department — Suspension. (1) When a peace officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a person
may be violating or has violated section 41-6-44 the peace officer may, in connection
with his arrest of the person, request the person to submit to a chemical test to
be administered in compliance with the standards set forth in section 41-6-44.10.
(2) The peace officer shall advise a person prior to the person's submission to
a chemical test that results indicating .08% or more by weight of alcohol in the
blood shall, and the existence of a blood alcohol content sufficient to render the
person incapable of safely driving a vehicle can, result in suspension or revocation
of the person's license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle.
(3) If the person submits to that chemical test and the results indicate a blood
alcohol content of .08% or more, or if the officer makes a determination, based
on reasonable grounds to believe that the determination is correct, that the person
is otherwise in violation of section 41-6-44, the officer directing administration of
the test or making the determination shall serve on the person, on behalf of the
department, immediate notice of the department's intention to suspend the person's
privilege or license to drive. If the officer serves that immediate notice on behalf
of the department he shall take the Utah driver license or certificate or permit,
if any, of the driver, issue a temporary license effective for only 30 days, and supply
to the driver, o-', a form to be approved by the department, basic information
regarding how to obtain a prompt hearing before the department. A citation issued
by the officer may, if approved as to form by the department, serve also as the
temporary license.
(4) The peace officer serving the notice shall send to the department within five
days after the date of arrest and service of the notice the person's license along
with a copy of the citation issued regarding the offense, and a sworn report indicating the chemical test results, if any, and any other basis for the officer's determination that the person has violated section 41-6-44, and the officer's belief regarding
the person's violation of section 41-6-44. Each such report shall be on a form
approved by the department and shall be endorsed by the police chief or his equivalent or by a person authorized by him, other than the officer serving the notice.
(5) Upon written request of a person who has been issued a 30-day license, the
department shall grant to the person an opportunity to be heard within 30 days
after the date of arrest and issuance of the 30-day license, but the request must
be made within 10 days of the date of the arrest and issuance of the 30-day license.
A hearing, if held, shall be before the department in the county in which the arrest
occurred, unless the department and the person agree that the hearing may be held
in some other county. The hearing shall be documented and its scope shall cover
the issues of whether a peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe the person
to have been operating a motor vehicle in violation of section 41-6-44, whether the
person refused to submit to the test, and the test results, if any In connection
with a hearing the department or its duly authorized agent may administer oaths
and may issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and the production of
relevant books and papers. One or more members of the department may conduct
the hearing, and any decision made after a hearing before any number of the members of the department shall be as valid as if made after a hearing before the full
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41-2-21

membership of the department. After the hearing, the department shall order,
either that the person's license or privilege to drive be suspended or that it not
be suspended. A first suspension, whether ordered or not challenged under this subsection, shall be for a period of 90 days, beginning on the 31st day after the date
of the arrest. A second or subsequent suspension under this subsection shall be
for a period of 120 days, beginning on the 31st day after the date of arrest. The
department shall assess against a person, in addition to any fee imposed under
subsection 41-2-8(7), a fee of $25, which must be paid before the person's driving
privilege is reinstated, to cover administrative costs, and which fee shall be cancelled if the person obtains an unappealled department-hearing or court decision
that the suspension was not proper. A person whose license has been suspended
by the department under this subsection may file a petition within 30 days after
the suspension for a hearing in the matter which, if held, shall be governed by
the provisions of section 41-2-20.
History: C. 1953, 41-2-19.6, enacted by L.
1983. eh. 99. §6.
41-2-20. Judicial review of license cancellation, revocation or suspension
— Scope of review. Any person denied a license or whose license has been canceled, suspended or revoked by the department except where such cancellation or
revocation is mandatory under the provisions of this act unless the suspension
occurred pursuant to section 41-2-19.6 shall have the right to file a petition within
thirty days thereafter for a hearing in the matter in a court of record in the county
wherein such person shall reside and such court is hereby vested with jurisdiction
and it shall be its duty to set the matter for hearing upon ten days' written notice
to the department. The court's jurisdiction is limited to a review of the record to
determine whether or not the department's decision was arbitrary or capricious.
History: L. 1933, ch. 45, § 20; 2935, ch. 47, thereupon to take testimony and examine
into the facts of the case and to determine
§ 2: C 1943, 57-4-23: L. 1983, ch. 99. § 7.
whether the petitioner is entitled to a license
Compiler's Notes.
or is subject to cancellation, suspension or
The 1983 amendment inserted "unless the revocation of license under the provisions of
suspension occurred pursuant to section this act" at the end of the first sentence: and
41-249.6" in the first sentence: deleted "and added the second sentence.
41-2-21. New license after revocation. (1) Any person whose license has been
revoked under this act shall not be entitled to apply for or receive any new license
until the expiration of one year from the date such former license was revoked
or longer as provided in sections 41-2-18 and 41-2-19. Licenses which have been
revoked may not be renewed, but application for a new license must be filed as
provided in section 41-2-8. and a license so issued shall be subject to all of the
provisions of an original license. The department shall not grant the license until
an investigation of the character, abilities and habits of the driver has been made
to indicate whether it will be safe to again grant him the privilege of using the
highways.
(21 Any resident or nonresident whose operator's license to operate a motor
vehicle in this state has been suspended or revoked as provided in this act shall
not operate a motor vehicle in this state under a license, permit, or registration
certificate issued by any other jurisdiction or otherwise during such suspension or
after such revocation until a new license is obtained when and as permitted under
this act.
History: L. 1933, ch. 45, §21: 1935, ch. 47.
§ 2: 1941, ch. 51. § 2: C. 1943, 57-4-24: L. 1967,
ch. S2. §12: 1983. ch. 183, §23.
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Compiler's Notes,
The 1983 amendment deleted "or chauffeur's" after "operator's'* in subsec. (2).
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41-6-43.10. Repealed.
Repeal.
Section 41-6-43.10 (L. 1955, ch. 71, § 1; 1957,
ch. 78, § 2; 1983, ch. 99, § 12), relating to negligent homicide, was repealed by Laws 1985
(IstS.S.), ch. 1, §2.
41-6-44. Driving under the influence of alcohol or drug or with high blood
alcohol content — Criminal punishment — Arrest without warrant — Suspension or revocation of license. (1) It is unlawful and punishable as provided in
this section for any person with a blood alcohol content of .08% or greater by
weight, or who is under the influence of alcohol or any drug or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree which renders the person incapable of
safely driving a vehicle, to drive or be in actual physical control of a vehicle within
this state. The fact that a person charged with violating this section is or has been
legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug does not constitute a defense against any
charge of violating this section.
(2) Percent by weight of alcohol in the blood shall be based upon grams of alcohol per one hundred cubic centimeters of blood.
(3) [a] Every person who is convicted the first time of a violation of Subsection
(1) [oi this section] shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than 60 days
nor more than six months, or by a fine of $299, or by both [streh] the fine and
imprisonment^ except that]. But if the person has inflicted a bodily injury upon
another as a proximate result of having operated the vehicle in a negligent manner,
he shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one
year, and, in the discretion of the court, by a fine of not more than $1,000.
(b) For the purposes of this section, the standard of negligence is that of simple
negligence, the failure to exercise that degree of care which an ordinarily reasonable and prudent person exercises under like or similar circumstances.
(4) In addition to the penalties provided for in Subsection (3), the court shall,
upon a first conviction, impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 48 consecutive hours nor more than ten days2 with emphasis on serving in the drunk tank
of the jail, or require the person to work in a community-service work program
for not less than two nor more than ten days and, in addition to the jail sentence
or the work in the community-service work program, order the person to participate in an assessment and educational series at a licensed alcohol rehabilitation
facility.
(5) (a) Upon a second conviction within five years after a first conviction under
this section or under a local ordinance similar to this section adopted in compliance
with Subsection 41-6-43 (1), the court shall, in addition to the penalties provided
for in Subsection (3), impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 48 consecutive hours nor more than ten daysz with emphasis on serving in the drunk tank
of the jail, or require the person to work in a community-service work program
for not less than ten nor more than 30 days and, in addition to the jail sentence
or the work in the community-service work program, order the person to participate in an assessment and educational series at a licensed alcohol rehabilitation
facility [•&&£ &e\ The court may, in its discretion, order the person to obtain treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility.
(b) Upon a subsequent conviction within five years after a second conviction
under this section or under a local ordinance similar to this section adopted in compliance with Subsection 41-6-43 (1), the court shall, in addition to the penalties provided for in Subsection (3), impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 30
nor more than 90 days with emphasis on serving in the drunk tank of the jail
or require the person to work in a community-service work project for not less
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41-6-44 2
41-6-44.2.

MOTOR \ EHICLES
Repealed.

Repeal.
Section 41-b-44 2 <L 1973 ch 80, §2 19*2
(2nd S S ) ch 4, § 2) relating to driving with

blood alcohol content of lO^r or higher, was
repealed bv Laws 1983 ch 99 §21

41-6-44.3. Standards for chemical breath analysis — Evidence. (1) The commissioner of public safety shall establish standards for the administration and
interpretation of chemical analysis of a person's breath including standards of
training
(2) In an\ action or proceeding in which it is material to pro\e that a person
was driving or in actual ph\sical control of a vehicle while under the influence
of alcohol or driving with a blood alcohol content statutorily prohibited, documents
offered as memoranda or records of acts, conditions or events to prove that the
anahsis was made and the instrument used was accurate, according to standards
established in subsection (1) shall be admissible if
(a) The judge finds that the\ were made in the regular course of the investigation at or about the time of the act, condition or event, and
(b) The source of information from which made and the method and circumstances of their preparation were such as to indicate their trustworthiness
(3) If the judge finds that the standards established under subsection (1) and
the conditions of subsection (2) have been met, there is a presumption that the
test results are valid and further foundation for introduction of the evidence is
unnecessary
History C 1953 41 6-44 3 enacted bv L
1979 ch 243 § 2 L 1983, ch 99 § 14

Findings required.
Prior to the acceptance of affidavits to
establish a presumption of validity of the
Compiler's Notes.
test results this section requires an affirmaThe 1983 amendment substituted "alcohol tive finding bv the trial court that the calicontent statutonh prohibited for alcohol bration and testing for accuracv of the
breathahzer and the ampoules were percontent of 10^ or greater in subsec (2)
substituted anahsis was made and the formed in accordance with the standards
instrument used was accurate according to established bv the commissioner of public
standards' for 'anahsis and accuracv of the safetv the affidavits were prepared in the
instrument were made pursuant to stan- regular course of the public officer s duties
that thev were prepared contemporaneously
dards in subsec (2) substituted 'condi
tions for provisions in subsec (3), and with the act condition or event, and the
source of information from which made and
made a minor change in phraseologv
the method and circumstances of their preparation were such as to indicate their trustConstitutionality.
worthiness affidavits were inadmissible
Given the legitimate governmental interest where the record was de\oid of such findings
in not having to produce in e\erv DLI case and where the affidavits showed on their
the public officer responsible for testing the face that rhe affiants did not attest from
accuracv of the breathalyzer and the their own personal knowledge Murray Citv
ampoules, and the alternative means availa- v Hall 11983) 663 P 2d 1314
ble to an accused to cross-examine and confront such a witness this section does not Hearsay exception
So long as there is compliance with the
violate the constitutional right of confronta
mandates of this section namel\, contempotion when all of its requirements are met
raneous preparation in accordance with
Murrav Citv v Hall (1983) 663 P 2d 1314
established standards in the regular course
Ampoules used in test.
of the officer s duties and indications of
Since the ampoules used in the testing are trustworthiness the affidavits regarding the
such an integral part of the breathalyzer maintenance of a breathahzer machine are
equipment, this section applies to such admissible under this section as a valid statampoules Murrav Cm v Hall (19*3) 663 P utory exception to the hearsav rule Murrav,
2d 1314
Citv v Hall (1983) 663 P 2d 1314
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DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
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A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y General
236 S t a t e C a p i t o l
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84114
Telephone:
533-76 06

APR 2 3 1986
XyDepul/ Cier*

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
RIC E. WANGSGARD,

]

Petitioner,
vs.

)I
I
;1

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

FRED C. SCHWENDIMAN, C h i e f ,
Driver License Services,
S t a t e of U t a h ,

]
!1
]1

Case No. C86-1376
J u d g e Raymond S. Uno

Respondent.

]

The a b o v e - e n t i t l e d m a t t e r h a v i n g come b e f o r e t h e C o u r t
p u r s u a n t t o Utah Code Ann. § 4 1 - 2 - 2 0 on March 1 1 , 1986 and t h e
c a s e h a v i n g been t a k e n under a d v i s e m e n t and t h e Court b e i n g
advised in the prenisesf

fully

now makes t h e f o l l o w i n g F i n d i n g s and

Conclusions.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Court f i n d s t h a t t h e r e i s c o m p e t e n t e v i d e n c e of

s u b s t a n c e i n t h e r e c o r d t h a t shows t h a t t h e p e t i t i o n e r
an o p p o r t u n i t y for

a h e a r i n g , was n o t p r e j u d i c e d ,

e x a m i n e r was n o t a r b i t r a r y or

capricious.

received

and t h e

hearing

2.

T h e r e was s u b s t a n t i a l

i officer

evidence to find t h a t

had r e a s o n a b l e g r o u n d s t o b e l i e v e t h a t

the

the

: i o n e r had been o p e r a t i n g a motor v e h i c l e i n v i o l a t i o n of

Having made t h e f o r e g o i n g F i n d i n g s of F a c t ,
makes

the

t h e Court

its:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Court c o n c l u d e s t h a t ,

L r b i t r a r i n e s s or c a p r i c i o u s n e s s ,

t h e r e b e i n g no

prejudice

t h e p e t i t i o n s h o u l d be

.lissed.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ADJUDGED, ORDERED AND DECREED t h a t
ition is

dismissed.

DATED t h i s

-~ ~

day of /'ir^si—

r

J

1986.

-

/

/

HONORABLE RAYMOND S. UNO
District Court Judge
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u m i

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY
317 State Office Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
(801) 533-4900

SCOTT / * . MATH6SON
Governor

LARRY £. LUNNEN
Commissioner

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

I hereby certify that the attached Breath Testing Regulations
are a true arid correct copy of the regulations established by the
Commissioner of Public Safety.

U^L

y<RRY g/LJJNNEN C
Commissioner of Public Safety

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF

ss.

d>L-

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

of

^/iJi

. 19 f y

.

K.

day

Revised: April 1, 1981
Archives file! 4714
BREATH TESTING REGULATIONS

Revised: November 4,,1983
Archives file* 6734

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY

sionzA.

! . TECHNIQUES OR METHODS
A.

Tests to determine the concentration of alcohol in a persons blood,
may be applied to blood, breath or other bodily substances.

Results

shall be expressed as equivalent to grams of alcohol per one hundred
(100) cubic centimeters of blood. The results of such tests shall be
entered in a permanent record book.
B.

Written check lists, outlining the method of properly performing
the tests in use under division A of this regulation, shall be
available at each location where tests are given.

The check list and

the test record shall be retained by the operator administering the
test or the arresting officer.
Definition:
A check list sets forth the steps, in sequence, that a breath
test operator must follow.

A square is provided by each of the

steps for the operator to check each one as it is performed to
insure proper operation of the test instrument.
II.

BREATH TESTS
A.

Breath samples of alveolar air shall be analyzed with instruments
specifically designed for the analysis of breath. The calculation
of the blood alcohol concentration shall be on the basis of aveolar
air to blood ratio of 2100:1.

Breath samples shall be analyzed

according to the methods described by the manufacturer of the
instrument or instructions issued by the office of the Commissioner
of Public Safety.

TESTS FOR CHECKING CALIBRATION
A,

Breath testing instruments must be certified on a routine basis
not to exceed forty (40) days.

B,

Calibration tests must be performed by a technician using appropriate solutions of ethyl alcohol, and using methods and techniques for
checking calibration recommended by the manufacturer of the
instrument or the office of the Commissioner of Public Safety.

C,

Results of test for calibration shall be kept in a permanent record
book.

A report of each calibration test shall be recorded on the

appropriate form and sent to the supervisor of the Breath Testing
Program.

The supervisor of the Breath Testing Program is hereby

designated as the official keeper of said records.
PROCEDURE FOR CERTIFICATION OF INSTRUMENTS
A.

Breathalyzer
1.

Instrument heating properly:
a.

2.

3.

between 47 and 53 degrees centigrade

Collection chamber output:
a.

COLD between 55 and 58 ccfs

b.

WARM between 50 and 54 ccMs

NULL meter functioning properly:
a*

Must be able to achieve a balance and swing freely in both
directions.

•

•

Read light in mechanical center:
Place two ampoules of the same control number in the holders,
turn on the read light, balance galvanometer and check for
mechanical center.
light.

Switch the ampoules, turn on the read

The null meter should not swing more than I inch in

either direction.
Blood alcohol pointer slippage check:
Balance the instrument with ampoules in the holders.

Set

the blood alcohol pointer on .20%, or center of the Blood
Alcohol scale. Using the light carriage adjustment, and with
the read light on, run the B. A . needle to .00% and back to
.20%, observing to see that the null meter balances at the
same time the B. A . needle reaches .20%. Then run the B.A
needle to .40% and back to .20% observing to see that the nul
meter balances at the .20% line on the blood alcohol scale.
Simulator Check:
At least three (3) simulator checks of a known value shall b*
run on the instrument.

The results must be within .01% plus

or minus of the actual value of the known solution.
Ampoule Check:
A series of simulator tests with the .accumulated total of .60*
shall be run on an ampoule from each control number on ha~d
with the instrument.

The results of each simulator test must

be within .01% plus or minus of the actual value.

The ampoJe

should then be observed to see if there is a slight yellow caor,
indicating the presence of potasium dichromate.

If it meets the

above standards, the chemicals are correct or within allowed
tolerances •

4.

Read light in mechanical center:
Place two ampoules of the same control number In the holders,
turn on the read light, balance galvanometer and check for
mechanical center.
light.

Switch the ampoules, turn on the read

The null meter should not swing more than i inch in

either direction.
5.

Blood alcohol pointer slippage check:
Balance the instrument with ampoules in the holders.

Set

the blood alcohol pointer on .20%, or center of the Blood
Alcohol scale. Using the light carriage adjustment, and with
the read light on, run the B. A . needle to .00% and back to
.20%, observing to see that the null meter balances at the
tame time the B. A . needle reaches .20%. Then run the B.A.
needle to .40% and back to .20% observing to see thai the null
meter balances at the .20% line on the blood alcohol scale.
6.

Simulator Check:
At least three (3) simulator checks of a known value shall be
run on the instrument.

The results must be within .01% plus

or minus of the actual value of the known solution.
7.

Ampoule Check:
A series of simulator tests with the .accumulated total of .60%
shall be run on an ampoule from each control number on hand
with the instrument.

The results of each simulator test must

be within .01% plus or minus of the actual value.

The ampoule

should then be observed to see if there is a slight yellow color,
indicating the presence of potasium dichromate.

If it meets the

above standards, the chemicals are correct or within allowed
tolerances.

B.

Intoxilyzer
1.

Place the mode selector switch in the zero set mode.

2.

ELECTRICAL POWER CHECK: With the power switch on,
observe to see that the power indicator light comes on,
indicating there is electrical power to the instrument.

3.

TEMPERATURE CHECK:

If the instrument is already

warmed up, check to see that the ready light is on.
If it is not warmed up, wait approximately 10 minutes
to see that the ready light comes on.

(This tight

indicates that the sample chamber Is heated to the
proper temperature).
4.

INTERNAL PURGE CHECK: Put the mode selector in
the air blank mode. Place thumb on the end of the pump
tube to see that it is pumping air.

Time the pumping

sequence to see that it pumps for approximately 35
seconds.
5.

ZERO SET AND ERROR INDICATOR CHECK:
Set the mode selector in the zero set mode.

(AS Model)
Depress the

zero adjust knob and adjust the digital display to a plus
• 000, .001, .002 or .003 to see that you can achieve a proper
zero set.

Re-set the digital display above the acceptable plus

.000 to .003.

Place the mode selector to the test mode and

observe to see that the error light comes on.

Repeat, placing

the digital display at minus .000 and observe to see that the
error light comes on when the mode selector is placed in the
test mode.

(ASA Model)
Advance the test cycle to the zero set mode and see that
the unit registers a reading of plus .000, .001, .002, or
• 003.

I f this reading is not observed, advance to the next

cycle and see that the error light comes on.
6.

FIXED ABSORBTION CALIBRATOR CHECK: With the test
card in the printer, run a test on the fixed absorbtion
calibrator to see that the instrument gives the correct
reading on the digital display and the printed test card.
THIS CHECK NOT REQUIRED ON INSTRUMENTS NOT
EQUIPPED WITH THE FIXED ABSORBTION CALIBRATOR.

c

7.

SIMULATOR CHECK:

Run three tests on a simulator

solution of a known value and an air blank before each
one.

Observe to see that the correct readings, within

plus or minus .01% of the actual value is indicated on the
digital display and printed on the test card for each simulator test and a .00% reading for each air blank.
8. -PRINTER DEACTIVATOR CHECK:

(AS Model) Run a

simulator test with the zero set NOT in the proper zero
set range, to see that the printer is deactivated and will
not print.
(ASA Model)
This check must be performed before the unit is up to
operating temperature. (before the ready lamp is on)
Advance the unit to the first purge cycle (air blank).
Observe the error light to see that it is lit.

At the end

of the test cycle (approximately 35 seconds), see that the
pump *tops and that the printer is deactivated and will
not print•

QUALIFICATIONS OF PERSONNEL
A.

Breath test shall be performed by a qualified operator who shall
have completed the operators course prescribed by the Commissioner
of Public Safety.

Operators shall use only those instruments

which they are certified to operate.
B.

Breath test operator certification requirements:
1.

Must have successfully completed training for each type of
instrument and pass the required test, as approved by the
Commissioner of Public Safety.

2.

Operators must complete an approved recertification training
course and pass a test every two (2) years to maintain their
certification.

C.

Breath test technician requirements:
1.

Must comply with one of the following:
a.

Must successfully complete the Breath Testing Supervisors
course offered by Indiana State University.

b.

A manufacturers repair technician course for the breath
testing instruments in use in the State of Utah*

c.

Be qualified by the nature of his employment or training
to maintain and repair the breath testing instrument in
question and to instruct In the proper operation of the
Instrument.

REVOCATION OF CERTIFICATION
A#

The Commissioner of Public Safety may on the recommendation of
a technician, revoke the certification of any operator:

1.

Who obtains a certification card falsely or deceitfully.

2.

Who fails to comply with the foregoing provisions governing
the operation of breath test instruments.

3.

Who fails to demonstrate satisfactory performance in
operating breath testing instruments.

PREVIOUSLY QUALIFIED PERSONNEL
The foregoing regulations shall not be construed as invalidating the
qualification of personnel previously qualified as either breath test
operators or breath test technicians under programs existing prior
to the promulgation of these regulations.

Such personnel shall be

deemed certified until such time as retraining would have been required were these regulations not in effect.
This provision shall take effect as if enacted contemporaneously with
the other Breath Testing Regulations of the Department of Public
Safety on June 11, 1979.
In the opinion of the Department of Public Safety, it is necessary to
the peace, health and welfare of the inhabitants of the State of Utah
that this regulation become effective immediately.

I N T O X I L Y Z E © BREATHALYZER OPERATOR T W I N I N G

A.

Training for original certification is to be conducted by a Breath
Test Technician and should include the following:
1 hour..•Welcome, registration, preview of Alcohol and Traffic Safety.
3 hours. .Effects of Alcohol in the Human Body.
3 hours. .Operational Principles of Breath Testing.
2 hours..Alcoholic Influence Report Form.
2 hours. .Testimony of the Arresting Officer.
3 hours. .Legal Aspects of Chemical Testing.
1 hour...Detecting the Drinking Driver.
8 hours*.Laboratory Participation.

(Running Simulator tests on the

instruments and tests on actual drinking subjects).
1 hour...Examination and Critiques of Course.
B.

Training for recertification is to be conducted by a Breath Testing
Technician and should include the following:
2 hours. .Effects of alcohol in the Human Body.
2 hours. .Operational principles of Breath Testing.
1 hour...Alcohol Influence Report Form and Testimony of arresting officer.
2 hours..Legal Aspects of Chemical Testing and Detecting and the
Drinking Driver.
1 hour.. .Exam.

C.

Anyone having previously successfully completed a twenty-four (24)
hour operators school, may be recertified at anytime by successfully
completing an eight (8) hour recertification course, and also may be
certified to operate another type of breath testing instrument after
eight (8) hours instruction pertaining to the instrument in question.

f^lF
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ORDER OF SUSPENSION
r*M

FILE NUMBER 011677860

!i

[j

BY AUTHORITY OF TITLE 41, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, IV IS
HEREBY ORDERED THAT YOUR PRIVILEGE TO OPERATE A MOTOR
VEHICLE ON THE HIGHWAYS OF THIS STATE IS SUSPENDED FOR A
PERIOD OF-3 MONTHS EFFECTIVE 04 FEBRUARY 1986.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT IF YOU HAVE NOT ALREADY DONE SO, YOU
IMMEDIATELY SURRENDER TO THIS DEPARTMENT YOUR UTAH DRIVER LICENSE, IF
ANY, AND ALL OTHER LICENSES ISSUED TO YOU.
THE GROUNDS FOR SUCH ACTION IS U.C.A. 41-2-19.6 AND THAT
A PEACE OFFICER HAD, REASONABLE GROUNDS TO BELIEVE YOU HAD
BEEN OPERATING A MOTOR VEHICLE IN VIOLATION OF U.C.A.
41-6-44 (DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE LAW).
UTAH LAW REQUIRES ANY PERSON WHOSE UTAH DRIVING PRIVILEGE
HAS BEEN SUSPENDED OR REVOKED TO PAY A $25.00 FEE FOLLOWING
THE REVOCATION OR SUSPENSION PERIOD TO HAVE THIS PRIVILEGE
REINSTATED. IN ADDITION TO THE REINSTATEMENT FEE, A $25.00
ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE FEE WILL BE ASSESSED WHEN THE
PRIVILEGE TO DRIVE HAS BEEN ADMINISTRATIVELY SUSPENDED FOR
BEING ARRESTED FOR DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE.
IF YOU HAVE NOT VOLUNTARILY SURRENDERED WITHIN 20 DAYS ALL
LICENSES AND PERMITS AND A PICKUP ORDER HAS BEEN ISSUED FOR
THESE ITEMS, AN ADDITIONAL $25.00 FEE WILL BE ASSESSED AT
THE TIME OF REINSTATEMENT.
IT IS A MISDEMEANOR TO OPERATE ANY MOTOR VEHICLE UPON THE
HIGHWAYS OF THIS STATE WHILE YOUR DRIVER LICENSE IS
SUSPENDED OR REVOKED.
YOU MAY APPEAL THIS ACTION IN A COURT OF RECORD IN THE
COUNTY OF YOUR RESIDENCE WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS.

RESPECTFULLY YOURS,
cc:

S c o t t R. Vangsgard
A t t o r n e y a t Law
U059 S. ^000 V.
W.V.D. UT fiUl20

FRED C. SCHWENDIMAN, BUREAU CHIEF
DRIVER LICENSE SERVICES
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OFFICE OF DRIVER LICENSE SERVICES
DRIVER IMPROVEMENT AND CONTROL
Report of Proceedings of Hearing for Administrative Suspension
(Section 41-2-19.6 UCA 1953 As Amended)
Date of
Hearing

Time Set
for Hearing

-afr-fcl 9:^2)/R

e and Address of Driver

-ZbC

Hearing Officer

JL^UJ^CLrrr^

t^-UA

Arresting Officer

Name and Address of Attorney

^JfrX&ffettflhA

£e^>+*<*>

Date of Birth

Witness &

Witness

Y&SJ^

Agency

ufc
Date of Arrest

Witnesar

Location of Hearing

Witness

/ - ^-vfe;I M^^^Jr^^r^
UAA+*

0

f^J

OPENING STATEMENT
This hearing is being conducted at the driver's request in accordance with Section 41-2-19.6 Utah
Code Annotated, following his arrest for driving while under the influence of alcohol or drugs or a
combination of alcohol and drugs.
Formal rules of evidence and procedure shall not strictly apply. However, as the Hearing Officer, I will
take sworn testimony and consider all relevant evidence presented at this hearing.
If your driving privilege is suspended, you shall have the right to petition a court of record in the county
in which you reside within thirty days after the effective date of such suspension for judicial review by
the court, as provided for in Section 41-2-20, Utah Code Annotated.
Those testifying will be sworn, and the hearing shall proceed.

Administrative notice is taken of the fact that the Office of Driver License Services is in receipt of the
following documents and information which are official records on file with this Department:

Yes

No

K

•

The officer's report submitted in compliance with UCA 41-2-19.6.

«

D

A citation indicating the driver's arrest for a violation of UCA 41-6-44.

4

D

Notice served by the officer of the Department's intent to suspend, and information on
how to receive a hearing by the Department.

tf •

Receipt of hearing request within ten days.

*
D

*L
PC

Test machine record of test results.

9L

D

Utah Highway Patrol record of the chemical test machine maintenance test and
affidavit pursuant to UCA 41-6-44.3.

K.

Other (ie. Documents and/or information received in behalf of the driver and/or other
evidence received which is made official record for the purpose of this hearing).
Explain:

Operational checklist of test instrument.

»»p*<rf> ^nStsz/Xtud*
Officer: ^ 2 3 sworn testinrv
Facts leading t> r w-„e offic
o believe the driver had been driving o
actua.
. . ai control of.?.
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or a combination of alcohol and any drug:

ctor.-

p*&Ca&l

%

~2*cd2&+y'2&~*~*&2^

JU,
Charge:

3rarre5i:
T> ^ X

INO U

ies i&

;) The driver submitted to a chemical test as requested by a peace officer which showed a test result of

.%.

d) The driver was advised prior to the chemical test that results could lead to suspension of his/her driving
privilege: No O
Yes pi
e) Officer who administered chemical test was certified to do so: No •

Yes S,

(f) Proper procedure was performed or observed by reporting officer in the administration of the chemical ..
test: No D
Yes^ QE
(explain procedure): t o *~*4y4*fet>*di! £fS&*iU ^t****f^l&cc
'6$tZ£4?f*tr*c&

(g) Evidence and/or information received indicaffng the test machine wasjq was not D in proper working order at-5 4 a
^
the time test was administered (explain): /^C^I^U<L£SZZU^^^<^/^^
***"

(h) DUI Report Form was properly notarized:

No •

Yes*!

2. Testimony of witness officer or other witness for reporting officer:

F. That there was ^ w
Jevid. -e of a chemical test and/or other basis f- heoffic.
.ermmationtha'*he
driver was in violation of 41-6-44. jst results _ ^ Z ^ L _ % or other (ie. drugs, ,-xplain: ^ e S 2 7 i * « » / * « ^ -

G. Other (not covered above); explain:

Y\

&UU£^_j •

CONCLUSIONS:
BASED UPON THE FOREGOING FINDINGS OF FACT, IT IS CONCLUDED THAT ALL OF THE STATUTORY
PROVISIONS REQUIRED TO SUSPEND THE DRIVING PRIVILEGE PURSUANT TO UCA 41-2-19.6 W E R ^ S ^
WERE NOT • IN PLACE IN THIS CASE, AND THE FOLLOWING DECISION IS RENDERED:
\ > T o suspend the driving privilege
•""^•by authority of UCA 41-2-19.6
Comments by hearing officer:

^

9^«_JL.

• To take no action
»

Hearing Officer:

y r f ^ ^

FOR CENTRAL OFFICE USE ON

Approved by: W

Title: C\

M//OX^^VI

Comments:

4

/•/•

P

3. Substance of testimony by driv

^ £ . ^ * y < ^ ^ ^ ^ ' *~=&zz^^

4. Substance of statements and/or questions by driver's legal counsel

\ci.J&3u£.

<0- -2*oo£

1

^&U».

,

£<^ Xx~a*/

i*s-s^

^Cc^,

*

^^-~-

E r d ^ ^ - ^ ^ g ^ D ^ u-4&c£&

s^ *~*«r-&di*^

IS-Z^OJJIJZ^

f4^^r7^^^

J^L^.

\*JP ^su

M

&ZL*<***4

HAVING HEARD AND RECEIVED EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THOSE PRESENT AT THIS HEARING. THE
DEPARTMENT NOW MAKES THE FOLLOWING FINDINGS OF FACT:
A. That the peace officer had reason to believe that the driver wasTS^ was not • in violation of UCA 41-6-44.
B. That the driver was^S^T was not D placed under arrest for a violation under UCA 41-6-44.
C. That the chemical test was^Sf was not • administered by an officer certified to do so.
D. That all operational procedures and requirements wer§j3^ were not • met to insure proper working order of the
test machine.
E. That all procedures and requirements w e r e j i ^ were not • followed by the reporting officer pursuant to UCA
41-2-19.6. (Explain what procedures were not fallowed, if any):

3

SUPPLEMENT TO HEARING REPORT.

EARING

DATE

W-ffc

SUBJECTS

TYPE

SUBJECTS FILE NO.

NAME

//&7?£&o

i$Z> £ • Ututffifbu?

/2je~>

UIJJUU.

^ dJZa*

_^^JL^0j&

s£o^»

Jln^Cu^u

jb-Le&Z&c

- /^U^

t^i£*s~ ,^a*Lj ^£ki<siy-'-

j9

^^

S?<^

^_#^&~*J?^k~£L*i*Jf6>*^~*

£^L

-?%i^
sjht&t'

& .

<l&<d<c
*

.6*>4±'*€>

>J£

C**WK4Z
dfdsCjt

''t*<^6*vuvL<*<***&<<<z

€-£<!*.

i^L^t JZj5T^£

&6
AC-

••+&->

:

00-"&Zr-^-

r£r^

i - t 4 , £>-L&*&t

~^7
T^^jL*

S

& ;

HEARING OFFICER'S

SIGNATURE

SUPPLEMENT TO HEARING REPORT

TE

£-®C

HEARING

TYPE

SUBJECTS

fM^

NAME

SUBJECTS FILE NO.

J?2^ g - ^J^y^X<S\

" U J ^ w ^ Qrrfc/L-

PJ"^

- --^ ^ ^ ^

//£>??£&&

~Z&c/jU

/U^^fa^^^

V

^L&&

z

T

a

V

/ ^ ^ ^ g ^ ^ v
e#<^

^g-^yct^,
sCg~

s£+c**-

/<£<> ******r•sC^^rrr^^t

^<^

--^fefiL. ^

^U^u^Jf
-tfb- di

~7>

^

_

«'«*<# <$&< ^"yrfvaiJ?

"C^^.

s*", {&****&*

<fr

/ttrf<l& Z&&,*#t<'

sfatrtj2*^*-

^

- £ £ - * ^

^

? Z*4^

'^*Lii-^^^*£
CCr)

/^HEAR
I N G OFFICEF
HEARING
OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

SUPPLEMENT TO HEARING REPORT

HEARING

DATE

1-1$.

SUBJECTS

TYPE

SUBJECTS FILE NO.

NAME

JAM

//<£7^o

-Vvj-*a<&

it

j p ^ s ^ e ^

/C^j£z£^J)

^<5pZU^3Z^

J&&3^

^~*A*epCJuj^

^fa

^v^n^ergv » C/.^f , f

-K-^

_teZL^ ^ , ^ P ^ ^ ^ / ^ ^ .
£

&

. 7 ^ ^ .^S^*/

fuux^^r

^rsr P

C^^SJJ^

JZZ^USZ.
*lrrf

1 W-»^V^

^2E55f-?

_J*LL

^t^e_

-n - i ^ ^ / - ^ r " i ? ^

a l t f ^ ^ ^ J /

V U L ^ - ' / 6 C C ^ ^ U J

~«^^Uso&

rr

^Tf

P'^J)
-LS^C^SSL I . . r-gyrO.

j*t£c*^
c c
-dL-a^-^^s^

°^-

s

CJUZXZ*

£><-*S*

u-aJjuUCbs.

^5-

?

£*s-d'cZA

^

sm^tx^

. / ^

^

^sCi*g>^£

****£+jpy^W&r^^c£dtt:*arT<x<L>

^• J U A ^

?6r

JU&dk

/\-/Cvx-cc4

^/A-g^fr^CV

x ^ v u ^ > ^Za

<£V***y^i^

UJ

~&Zl*-

/r^c^ej?

_

y^

^r
r"

ZZZZc**

rTf

cv

**

a

'«£.
^HEARING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE-

SUPPLEMENT TO HEARING REPORT

iTE

HEARING

TYPE

- g -%4£L , ^

SUBJECTS

NAME

SUBJECTS FILE NO.

1 [&U £- UJa^y^^JP 1 \~~//£77<feo

<Z& U fit?*': <ff*

yuur~
"l/9)^V—t^&lUS&aer-*

Ctfa4.«&tf<*s<d? ^>y

\sL>&tseg

(?&rvh
J^X**f?rry\

P ^ ^ ' W P l

ida&tf*

j>*^*+m-*mm

§jiV'*mW*m™-\

* & & *

*"<P- 4ffi-6L/&

t^-^g

.stsCfT
£L<ts-n,
« - 6'^UA^^^n,
-

"fax:

/ y ^ ^ j j ^

b)

S^jfe^&l^

JL

ZZc^->

^U2z.~z£g£frxJft*

J^L^CL
HEARING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

SUPPLEMENT TO HEARING REPORT

HEARING

DATE

SUBJECTS

TYPE

/-z£- **-[/&
4*s-

SUBJECTS FILE NO.

NAME

' (^ a*M^*2^*2'*d' I

fec<>

\

/ /£> ~? *?£& O

&«t**kXi?.d

0U4~~fc>

TT

&?Jrt, \»Hnst Cstus

JL'-'
4&- - r /

4><^* \f-eJQ,

t e*£n^

i_-_~«->- '->•

^"A <-

7

JL^ x L ^ t f f!4Q.

J^T*

/Lo<-£*^~
r

4t,*<*C*<i.&

*4jQ.

•£&4&4ii

... 7:

^d$^

\j , rUQ

—

g

(V

,/L jLj&&r4rfZsl£ld*<sL'tt. t hr

"52r-LJ&<L*n~
HEARING OFFICER'S SIGNATIilRT

SUPPLEMENT TO HEARING REPORT.

JE

HEARING

TYPE

SUBJECTS

WWTZ

/?Jc ,f-a

NAME

SUBJECTS FILE NO.

/,-<«y^J \2&77S&o

/-

uszz*<*-> AsUn
,*S****

(tit

f=^r

.AAt d< fiH tCtra enm

\

V
•U-

[rw rt jtfi^tJh

l&%Ctt/~.

•£.

sttiA-f^

^ei^

irz

^fe

&r?<1ljtf£?L .Jgk&i

CSS<<«f ^u.
c*f

A
\jr\A*A*+
1

'

•^/-D
"

' V,mm

J

jf?4«Z*CUi£t<U*4i-*t

/ l — W ^ J * W Lr*V^ u r n ^ T <%?**«£fo*L
^

£.
-*-—•* ^ > - Y V -4L"

+~*\ ^yCuj^

P

A err*-

Z&d-

***d?

J&&.

^JjCtU* L*-Jj££*

%
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HEARING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

W * 4~»*«

14.1 VJ W • ' < • A

G the undersigned,

A nAAtWM

..ig fir

J »<L« W W A \ i-S

V_/A

l i W U A i U l

t i - H

i LJ 1

S \ JY U

A T T i U A

V J i

( A j

" /

duly sworn, state that:

1.

Breath testing instrument, INTOXILYZER, serial number ^/V^
00\/0£>3
was
properly
checked
by
me/us
in the course
/?///'
located at
m&(+
/M<? /{M.
of official duties, on
U&ec£rribs''t
13 "^T at

2.

This was done according to the standards established by the Commissioner of
the Utah Department of Public Safety.

3.

This is the official record and notes of this procedure which were made at the
time these tests were done.

! FOLLOWING TESTS WERE MADE:
Electrical power check:
Temperature check

YES

(Power switch on, power indicator light is on)

NO

f )

(Ready light is on)

f ]

Internal purge check: (Air pump works, runs for approximately 35 seconds)

f ]

Zero s e t , Error indicator, and Printer check:
(Zero set at -000, .001, .002, .003)

t ]

(With proper zero sat, printer works properly)

r j

(Printer deactivated when error light is on)

f J

Fixed absorbtion calibrator test (if equipped)
(Reads within - .01* of calibration setting)
Checked with known sample:

[ ]

(Simulator, 3 tests within - . 01 %)

-*'

1 )

Gives readings in percent blood dlcohol by weight, based upon grams of
alcohol per 100 cubic centimeters of blood.
URS REQUIRED

A/<fn4(If yes, explain)
simulator solution was of the correct kind and properly compounded.

i 1

The results of this test show that the instrument is working prcperly.

[ )

prior check of this instrument was done on

*7 /' A'2 /c^-r? &£*C

(7x>Z£*i

^L.

"E OF'UTAH
/
JTY OF

=r

sn

\J

, t

l\

'

'

City of Residence

r1

V

,

iribed and sworn Before me this (/? £Lday of /{JJL^^L^^

amission

,j*+

_*4a.

I/we, on oaj_h .vjjtate that't^e-ioregoing is true.
v

1 1

/ff^CT

'BHZATH TEST TECHNICIAN (S)
'/

JL
'J*4*

flCcJjJ

County of Residence
19

LU

\*8sT
hZ^L

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY
HIGHWAY SAFETY DIVISION

OFFICE OF DRIVER LICENSE SERVICES
4501 South 2700 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119
(801)965-4411

T *V MATHESON
Governor

ROBERT F. PARENTI
Director

IRY I. LUNNEN
*orr»mi«s#on«f

FRED C SCHWEN01MAN, Mgr.
Driver Ucenj* Services

DRIVER LICENSE ADMINISTRATION HEARING RULES AND REGULATIONS
FOR ALCOHOL-RELATED OFFENSES

PURPOSE AND INTENT

It is the purpose and intent of these rules and regulations to
implement the legislative intent set forth in Utah Code Annotated
41-2-19.6 as amended, and more specifically, subparagraph five (5)
of the cited statute.

This is, to safely protect persons traveling

on roads and highways in the State of Utah by quickly removing from
those roads and highways persons who have shown that they are safety
hazards by driving with a drug or alcohol content that renders the
individual driver a hazard to the safety of the traveling public, or
where there is evidence that would show that the individual was
impaired to such a degree that his is incapable of driving safely on
the highways of the State of Utah.

PERSONS ENTITLED TO A HEARING

Any person who is arrested under the provisions of Utah Code
Annotated 41-6-44 or any alcohol-related statutes that apply under
Utah Code Annotated 41-2-19.6 who makes proper written application
pursuant to the .laws of the State of Utah, is entitled to a hearing.

PLAINTIFFS

HOW TO REQUEST A HEARING

A person who is entitled to a hearing must make a written request
to the administrative offices of the Department of Public Safety, Office
of Driver License Services, located in Salt Lake City, Utah, 4501 South
2700 West, 84119.

Such written request shall include the name of the

individual, the current address, the date of birth and/or license number
of the driver, and date and place of arrest,

NOTICE OF HEARING

The driver will be notified in writing at the last known address
contained in the official records of the department (or the new address
if one is provided by the driver in the request for a hearing) of the
time and the place to appear for the requested hearing.

PLACE AND TIME OF HEARING

The hearing will be held in the county in which the arrest occurred,
in the offices of the Office of Driver License Services, Department of
Public Safety, or a place convenient to the department and the individual
driver.
final.

In cases of disagreement, the decision of the department is
The hearing will take place within 30 days of the date of arrest.

APPLICATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE SUSPENSIONS

Unless drugs are involved, an administrative suspension hearing will
be given, only in cases where the officer's report on its face shows a
test result of .08% or more by weight of alcohol in the blood.

-2-

If the

results are less than .082, administrative suspension can be taken under
Utah Code Annotated 41-2-19. However, this is separate from any possible
criminal proceedings.
Where only drugs are involved, the department may take administrative
action based on the officer's sworn report submitted pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated 41-2-19.6.
If the individual refuses a test, the department will take action
as required under Utah Code Annotated 41-6-44.10.

PROCEDURES

The hearing officer or the department representative shall
substantially comply with the requirements set forth in Utah Code
Annotated 41-2-19.6 as amended, and more specifically, those requirements contained in subparagraph five (5) of that statute.

The

hearing officer shall not be bound by formal rules of evidence or
procedure in the administration of this hearing but shall consider all
relevant evidence.
The hearing shall be documented.

Its scope shall cover the issues

contained in the laws of the State of Utah, specifically, the issues
of whether or not the peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe
the person had been operating a motor vehicle in violation of Section
41-6-44 Utah Code Annotated as amended, there was a .08% or more
reading.

The hearing officer may consider whether or not a proper

warning was given as required by Utah Code Annotated 41-2-19.6,
The hearing officer may take sworn testimony and shall consider
the same, depending on its relevance.

-3-

The hearing officer shall have

discretion- in determining the relevance and appropriateness of testimony
or other submitted documentary evidence.
The hearing officer shall document the substance of the testimony
or evidence presented at the hearing on forms approved by the department

hear m)
by typed or written notation.
made as part of the record.

Tape recordings of the iaaVimg 'shall be

The hearing officer must make his findings

and conclusions on forms approved by the department, and said decisions
should be based on relevant evidence considered at the hearing.
TIME OF SUSPENSION

If no hearing is timely requested in writing, or if the driver
fails to appear at a requested hearing, such suspension will take effect
automatically on the 31st day after the arrest.

After a hearing, an

automatic suspension will begin on the 31st day after the date of arrest
unless the intended suspension is overruled for a cause at a hearing
conducted by the hearing officer of Driver License Services, Department
of Public Safety.

NOTICE OF SUSPENSION

When a hearing is held, the driver will be issued an Order of
Suspension in compliance with Utah Code Annotated 41-1-16.

This order

shall originate in the Office of Driver License Services1 administrative
offices and will state the reason for suspension, the period of time
the driving privilege is suspended, and in all cases will become
effective on the 31st day after the date of arrest.

-4W****

APPEAR PROCEDURES

If its actions are properly appealed, the department may, upon
request, provide to a court of record the necessary documentation to
comply with the requirements of Utah Code Annotated 41-2-20.

-5-%
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STATE OF UTAH

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY
NORMAN K

9ANCERTER.

DOB: 12-02-54
JOHN T. NIELSEN, COMMISSIONER

COVCRNOR

0 . OOUGUS aoORERO, OEPUTY COMMISSIONER
L DAIE ELTON, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER

RIC E WANGSGARD
2802 W 3500 SO
SALT LAKE CITY, UT. 84119

ORDER OF SUSPENSION
FILE NUMBER 011677860

BY AUTHORITY OF TITLE 41, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED THAT YOUR PRIVILEGE TO OPERATE A MOTOR
VEHICLE ON THE HIGHWAYS OF THIS STATE IS SUSPENDED FOR A
PERIOD OF 3 MONTHS EFFECTIVE 04 FEBRUARY 1986.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT IF YOU HAVE NOT ALREADY DONE SO, YOU
IMMEDIATELY SURRENDER TO THIS DEPARTMENT YOUR UTAH DRIVER LICENSE, IF
ANY, AND ALL OTHER LICENSES ISSUED TO YOU.
THE GROUNDS FOR SUCH ACTION IS U.C.A. 41-2-19.6 AND THAT
A PEACE OFFICER HAD REASONABLE GROUNDS TO BELIEVE YOU HAD
BEEN OPERATING A MOTOR VEHICLE IN VIOLATION OF U.C.A.
41-6-44 (DRIVING WDER THE INFLUENCE LAW).
UTAH LAW REQUIRES ANY PERSON WHOSE UTAH DRIVING PRIVILEGE
HAS BEEN SUSPENDED OR REVOKED TO PAY A $25.00 FEE FOLLOWING
THE REVOCATION OR SUSPENSION PERIOD TO HAVE THIS PRIVILEGE
REINSTATED. IN ADDITION TO THE REINSTATEMENT FEE, A $25.00
ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE FEE WILL BE ASSESSED WHEN THE
PRIVILEGE TO DRIVE HAS BEEN ADMINISTRATIVELY SUSPENDED FOR
BEING ARRESTED FOR DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE.
IF YOU HAVE NOT VOLUNTARILY SURRENDERED WITHIN 20 DAYS ALL
LICENSES AND PERMITS AND A PICKUP ORDER HAS BEEN ISSUED FOR
THESE ITEMS, AN ADDITIONAL $25.00 FEE WILL BE ASSESSED AT
THE TIME OF REINSTATEMENT.
IT IS A MISDEMEANOR TO OPERATE ANY MOTOR VEHICLE UPON THE
HIGHWAYS OF THIS STATE WHILE YOUR DRIVER LICENSE IS
SUSPENDED OR REVOKED.
YOU MAY APPEAL THIS ACTION IN A COURT OF RECORD IN THE
COUNTY OF YOUR RESIDENCE WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS.

PLAINTIFFS
EXHIBIT

RESPECTFULLY YOURS,
•86 cc:

Scott R. Wangsgard
Attorney at Lawk059 S. kOOO W.
W.V.C. UT 81*120

DI 203

FRED C. SCHWENDIMAN, BUREAU CHIEF
DRIVER LICENSE SERVICES

FEB 2 0 1986
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